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EXTERNAL - POLITICAL

1. Disarmament (OFFICIAL USE ONLY): After a brief interval during which disarmament was seldom mentioned in the Soviet press, the topic reappeared with Soviet communications July 25 to the Western participants in the Geneva 10-power meeting reaffirming alleged Soviet desire for full disarmament. The messages run the gamut of Soviet propaganda positions on disarmament. A new element, foreshadowed in Khrushchev's May 28 speech to shockworkers about the composition of future summit meetings, states the Soviet's belief that participation in future disarmament meetings should be broadened, presumably to include Communist China and other Asian powers. The Soviet press for the first time indicated the current Chicom position on disarmament in an article published July 23. This article quoted exerpts from Peiping's July 6 note replying to the May 27 Soviet communication addressed to all countries justifying its walkout from the Geneva 10-power meeting. The major points that emerged from the exerpts were (1) that the Soviet Government was correct in abandoning the 10-power talks since Western powers were obviously using these talks to deceive world opinion; (2) that Peiping has favored disarmament in word and deed; (3) that the only way to achieve disarmament is to force Western powers into a position where they will have to accept disarmament terms dictated by the bloc.

2. Congo Republic developments receded in Soviet press coverage with Premier Lumumba's arrival in the US and UN Seretary General Hammarskjold's arrival in Leopoldville. The scant initial attention given to the two visits suggested that the Soviets preferred for the moment to play a waiting game pending further concrete developments in the Congo situation. In the meantime, Soviet propaganda continued to excoriate Belgium's alleged flouting of the UN Security Council's July 14 and 21 resolutions, charging that the UN action was being used as a cover for "imperialist" subversion of the new state. The US was identified as the real moving force behind Belgium in what Moscow described as an act of "collective colonialism" against Congo. Hammarskjold -- and in still greater degree UN Under Secretary General Bunche -- continued to be the subject of press criticism, Hammarskjold on the grounds that he was pursuing a "strange policy" of collusion with the Belgians, Bunche on the grounds that he was acting not as a UN official but as an agent of Washington. Soviet propaganda also devoted considerable attention to the problem of Katanga and Belgian military bases, taking the predictable line that the bases must be evacuated and that Katanga must remain an integral part of Congo. Despite the apparent effort to retain freedom to criticize

the UN action, there was no indication that the Soviets were contemplating any unilateral action in the form of the dispatch of forces to Congo.

3. The RB-47 incident all but disappeared from the Soviet press during the week, with only a brief flurry of reports caused by the Security Council debate. These gave summaries of the Soviet statements, the text of the Soviet resolution, and only the essence of the US charge that the aircraft never violated Soviet airspace and was shot down far from Soviet territory. The press reported the 9-2 votes against the USSR, but gave little information on the substance of the Western resolutions. The main papers finished their coverage of the UN debate by concentrating venomous attacks on Lodge, which Izvestiya openly linked to the possibility of his nomination for the vice presidency.

4. Cuba: The USSR continued to back away from its early militant tone on the Cuban issue. Khrushchev in his message to Castro on the July 26 anniversary notably failed to reiterate his threat to use rockets while other coverage during the week projected an image of the Cuban Government with Soviet help concentrating on creative peaceful efforts for the wellbeing of its population, immensely popular at home and abroad, a model for all Latin America of liberation from US imperialism, and therefore the object of US malevolence.

The immediate sugar and oil crisis having passed, Soviet propaganda is now preparing to portray the US Government as attempting to mobilize its hirelings in Latin America to help strangle Cuba against the will of the masses.

5. Ideological questions apparently carried forth from the Bucharest meeting of Communist parties, with implications for Soviet-CPR relations, continued to appear in Soviet press coverage. The most notable single item was a lengthy summary of a speech by Palmiro Togliatti, which was published in Pravda (July 28).

Essentially Togliatti reaffirmed Khrushchev's main theses (and charges) in his speech at the Rumanian Party Congress. Despite the resumed aggressiveness of the US, he argued, as shown in the U-2 incident and at the Paris summit meeting, Communist goals remained as before the reduction of international tension and the convening of a new summit meeting. He then referred to "debates" which had arisen over "more distant goals," and immediately adverted to the thesis of the non-inevitability of war, to which the bulk of his article was in fact addressed. In terms reminiscent of Khrushchev at the Rumanian Congress, Togliatti called "those who criticize" the thesis 50 years behind the times. The two essential differences in the present situation, he declared, are

The nature of modern war and the change in the correlation of forces between the two camps. On the subject of the nature of war Togliatti gave his own version of the somber picture painted recently by Khrushchev and other bloc leaders, notably Novotny and Gomulka (Pravda July 8 and 9). He said that war could lead to the "complete destruction of centres of civilization," and warned of US military capability as being able to inflict incalculable damage to Socialist countries, (though being met with crushing Soviet counter-action). In what seemed intended as a barb at the Chinese Communists, Togliatti admitted the continuing validity of the proposi ion on the difference between just and unjust wars, but added that the possibility of total destruction necessarily modified the proposition. Concretely he adduced the hypothetical example of Italy turned into a "desert" following a nuclear war and asked rhetorically could Socialism really be built on this basis. Togliatti claimed that to argue that it was possible to approach Socialism through war would amount to deceiving the people.

Togliatti subsequently reverted to the question of "deceiving the people" in a passage which may be indicative of a key area of intra-bloc dispute, one where Moscow possibly has been on the defensive. He argued that there is a close connection between the proposition that war is not inevitable and the need for continued struggle against imperialism. "Only he who thinks schematically, cut off from reality, does not notice the connection," he said. He again declared that the proposition about the non-inevitability of war does not foster illusions in the masses since at the same time the masses are called on to struggle in order to make war avoidable.

Whatever the precise significance of Togliatti's allusions, the references to "debates," people 50 years behind the times, "those who criticize," and "schematic" thinking conveyed the strong impression of continuing intra-bloc reverberations of the Bucharest meeting.

Republican

6. The Republican Convention received relatively little coverage in the Soviet press, either before or after Vice President's nomination. The press treatment of Nixon continued to be uniformly unfavorable. Senator Kennedy continued to be portrayed (New Times No. 30) as a devious political schemer without deep principle who had failed to take issue with the Eisenhower foreign policy on matters of substance. His agreement to the "racist" Senator Johnson as his running-mate and his espousal of the policy of negotiations from a position of strength were said to threaten the Democrats with damaging loss of popular support in November.

INTERNAL

7. Leadership: From today's press accounts, N.S.KHRUSHCHEV has been making one of his sporadic provincial tours over the past eight days. This trip reportedly involved sightseeing, visiting enterprises, farms and housing sites, engaging in "lively" on-the-spot conversations and "constructive" criticism while progressing from Stalingrad (July 21-24) to Astrakhan (July 25-27) and on to the Crimea "forest" via Kiev (July 28). Commencing in Astrakhan, his entourage has included as his personal guests e East Germany's Walter ULBRICHT and Hungary's Yanos KADAR. This previously not publicized tour may account for difficulties encountered recently by foreign embassy personnel in attempting to arrange visits to the lower Volga area.

In Khrushchev's absence, Soviet leadership activity in Moscow over the past week has been minimal, and a number of the leaders normally resident here, including A.I.MIKOYAN and F.R.KOZLOV, may have chosen to leave town to avoid Moscow's present heat wave. In this context of relative inactivity by other leaders, M.A.SUSLOV has figured prominently since his return from representing the Presidium at Soviet Lithuania's 10th anniversary festivities last week. He gave the major report on the "results of the July plenum" at the July 26 conference of the Moscow Party "aktiv" and apparently repeated the performance July 28 at the corresponding conference of the Leningrad Oblast Party "aktiv". A.B.ARISTOV and P.N.POSPELOV were present at the Moscow "aktiv" meeting, Pospelov represented the leadership at the All-Russian Health Conference July [illegible], and both attended the Moscow Oblast Party conference July 28. Neither Aristov or Pospelov are reported as having given major speeches on these occasions. (Pospelov spoke at the latter, but Moscow Oblast First Secretary G.G.ABRAMOV made the main report on the July Central Committee plenum.)

8. Meetings and Conferences

Party Meetings Discuss Plenum Decisions. Over the past week, Party meetings large and small throughout the country have discussed and approved the decisions taken at the July Plenum of the Central Committee. Among the more important meetings were the following: On July 26 the Moscow City Party aktiv assembled to hear addresses by Presidium member M.A.SUSLOV and other speakers on the tasks confronting it in connection with implementing the Plenum decisions. Similar meetings were held by the Moscow Oblast and Leningrad aktivs, the former addressed by Presidium members A.B.ARISTOV and P.N. POSPELOV and the latter by Suslov. A plenum of the Ukrainian Central Committee on July 27 reviewed the progress being made in the Ukraine in carrying out the July Plenum decisions.